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The vast majority of U.S. federal debt is now held by the richest
households and largest companies, raising concerns about
inequality and power.
The financial crisis has seen an explosion in government debt levels, and there is now increasing
concern about both its sustainability and ownership by foreign investors. Sandy Hager takes a
close look at an often overlooked aspect in current debates – the pattern of federal debt
ownership by domestic stakeholders within the U.S. He argues that past decades have seen an
unprecedented concentration of federal debt in the hands of the richest one percent of
households and the largest corporations. These elite interests, he writes, have little interest in
reducing debt levels, and their frequent calls for debt reduction are in fact a mask for their agenda
of cutting social programs.
During the current financial crisis, government debt levels across the advanced capitalist world have soared. In the
United States, the portion of the federal debt ‘held by the public’ has more than doubled from 36 percent of GDP in
2007 to 73 percent in 2012. This explosive increase in the federal debt raises an important question that strikes at
the heart of the future of the US political economy: who is buying up this rising mountain of US Treasury
securities?
For the most part, policy makers and pundits alike have fixated on the rising share of the federal debt owned by
the ‘rest of the world’. Foreign central banks and private investors now own around half of the federal debt,
provoking fears about the influence that foreign creditors, especially China, might have on US policy as a result of
their treasury holdings.
But there is another aspect that has been completely
overlooked in the current debates. And that is the pattern
of ownership by domestic private stakeholders within the
US: the American households and businesses who
together still own roughly one-third or $3.8 trillion of the
outstanding federal debt.
This neglect of domestic ownership is especially curious
given the long history of controversy surrounding the
issue. Dating back to the era of independence, a debate
has raged in the US, with some arguing that the federal
debt is widely owned and others suggesting that it is
heavily concentrated. Yet without access to reliable data,
these earlier claims were never subjected to any precise
empirical investigation.
In an effort to re-invigorate this long-standing tradition, my
research marks the first effort to systematically map the
pattern of domestic ownership of the US federal debt. The
data is often patchy, but the estimates still reveal a
staggering trend towards ownership concentration over
the past three decades.
In the post-World War II period, the top 1 percent of US households owned around 20 percent of the household
sector share of the federal debt, while the largest 2,500 US corporations owned around 65 percent of the
corporate sector share of the federal debt, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 below. Since the early 1980s,
however, these shares have increased to over 40 percent and 80 percent, respectively. Based on this research, I
argue that over the past three decades, and especially in the context of the current crisis, the federal debt has
come to serve as an institution of power working in the interests of those at the very top of the social hierarchy.
Figure 1 – The Top Percentile’s Share of Household Holdings of Federal Debt
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearly by connecting adjacent observations.
Source: Lampman (1962) for 1922-1961; the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances for 1962-1968, 1970-2010; the IRS’s Personal Wealth Report for the 1% share of
the public debt in 1969, Smith (1974) for individual ownership of the public debt in 1969.
Table 1 – Large Corporations’ Share of Corporate Holdings of Federal Debt
Period Large Corporations
(total)
Large Corporations
(% total)
Ownership Concentration*
1957-61 2,344 0.2 66%
1977-81 2,676 0.1 65%
2006-10 2,675 0.05 82%
*Ownership concentration refers to the percentage share of corporate holdings of the
public debt that are owned by large corporations.
Note: The values in the last three columns are calculated as simple averages for the
corresponding five-year period. The cutoff point for large corporation is assets of $50
million or more for 1957-61, $250 million or more for 1977-81, $2.5 billion or more for 2006-
10.
Source: IRS Statistics of Income
One common rebuttal to these arguments suggests that a significant number of Americans have an indirect stake
in the federal debt thanks to their ownership of pension funds, mutual funds, and other financial intermediaries,
which invest heavily in treasury securities. Indirect ownership of the federal debt, according to this view, helps to
offset concentration in direct ownership.
This claim, though, is highly misleading. And the reason is that ownership of financial wealth (including corporate
stocks and bonds, mutual and pension funds, etc.) has itself become heavily concentrated over the past three
decades. Edward Wolff’s pioneering work indicates that the top percentile’s share of financial wealth was roughly
equal to the share owned by the bottom 95 percent of households in the 1960s. Yet by 2010, the bottom 95
percent’s share of financial wealth represented only two-thirds of the share owned by the top percentile!
In the end, it’s difficult to deny that ownership of the federal debt has become increasingly concentrated over the
past three decades. But even if we accept the empirical findings, the conclusions drawn here might seem counter-
intuitive, if not completely contradictory. After all, aren’t ruling elites adverse to big government and to large federal
debts?
To be sure, further increases to the federal debt might impact the perceived creditworthiness of the federal
government and draw the ire of wealthy elites who constitute the largest fraction of federal bondholders. Yet at the
same time, substantial reductions to the federal debt are bound to upset those same bondholders, who have
come to rely on the Treasuries market as a ‘safe haven’ in a time of systemic crisis.
What then are we to make of groups like ‘Fix the Debt’, led by billionaire Pete Peterson and set up for the express
purpose of lobbying for federal debt reduction? How can the federal debt serve as an institution of power if these
powerful interests seem so opposed to it?
Even a cursory glance at the fiscal strategy of the ‘Fix the Debt’ campaign shows that it is much more concerned
with cutting social programs than with reducing the federal debt. And as Paul Krugman points out, it is difficult to
regard all the fear mongering about federal debt and deficits as little more than a ploy for groups like Fix the Debt
to broaden support for what they really want: drastic cuts in social spending.
Austerity, rather than debt reduction, turns out to be an ideal fiscal strategy for powerful interests. Not only do
social spending cuts help to preserve the value and sanctity of existing Treasuries, they also relieve some of the
pressures for tax hikes, which would fall more heavily on the incomes of the rich and powerful.
Growing wealth and income inequality has come to shape almost every aspect of social life. It should therefore
come as no surprise that inequality also permeates the issue of public finance. But thus far the debates over
America’s fiscal politics have completely ignored the rapid concentration in domestic ownership of the federal
debt. Perhaps efforts to resist the current austerity agenda should start with the following question: how are the
federal government’s increasingly powerful creditors going to react to a more progressive fiscal alternative?
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